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Some people report localised pain on their body when seeing other people in pain (sensory-
localised vicarious pain responders).  In this study we assess whether this is related to 
atypical computations of body ownership which, in paradigms such as the Rubber Hand 
Illusion (RHI), can be conceptualised as a Bayesian inference as to whether multiple sources 
of sensory information (visual, somatosensory) belong together on a single body (one’s own) 
or are distributed across several bodies (vision=other, somatosensory=self).  According to 
this model, computations of body ownership depend on the degree (and precision) of 
sensory evidence, rather than synchrony per se.   Sensory-localised vicarious pain 
responders exhibit the RHI following synchronous stroking and – unusually – also after 
asynchronous stroking.  Importantly, this occurs only in asynchronous conditions in which 
the stroking is predictable (alternating) rather than unpredictable (random).  There was no 
evidence that their bottom-up proprioceptive signals are less precise, suggesting individual 
differences in the top-down weighting of sensory evidence.  Finally, the Enfacement illusion 
(EI) was also employed as a conceptually-related bodily illusion paradigm that involves a 
completely different response judgment (based on vision rather than proprioception).  
Sensory-localised responders show a comparable pattern on this task after synchronous and 
asynchronous stroking.  This is consistent with the idea that they have top-down (prior) 
differences in the way body ownership is inferred that transcends the exact judgment being 
made (visual or proprioceptive).   
 









The sense of self primarily arises from the feeling of one’s body (Costantini, 2014; 
Tsakiris, 2017). Notably, the experience of our bodily self is not always definite or coherent 
as revealed by bodily illusions on neurotypical participants (e.g. Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Tsakiris, 2008; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009) or neurological symptoms following brain-damage 
such as somatoparaphrenia (denial of limb ownership; Feinberg, Venneri, Simone, Fan & 
Northoff, 2009).  Even within the general (neurotypical) population there are likely to be 
substantial differences in the phenomenological experience of the bodily self that are 
underpinned by individual differences in the fidelity of relevant bodily signals and/or 
differences in the way that these signals are evaluated.  One relevant group are people who 
report feeling the pain of others (termed vicarious pain responders; Grice-Jackson, Critchley, 
Banissy & Ward, 2017; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010).  For these people, observations of pain 
elicit a pain-like phenomenology on their own body (and often a mirroring of other kinds of 
sensations and feelings) (Fitzgibbon, Giummarra, Georgiou-Karistianis, Enticott, & 
Bradshaw, 2010).  Thus, observed bodily experiences on other people are jointly shared 
between self and other, and this can arguably reflect a misattribution of body ownership 
(Ward & Banissy, 2015).  In this view, vicarious pain can act as a marker of important 
neurocognitive differences in body perception (beyond the defining symptom of vicarious 
pain itself).  The present study uses presence/absence of vicarious pain to address key 
questions relating to the mechanisms of body ownership, and its variability within the general 
population.  Two paradigms relating to body ownership and self-other judgments are used: 
the Rubber Hand Illusion and the Enfacement Illusion.   
The most popular paradigm proving the malleability of bodily ownership is the rubber 
hand illusion (RHI) (Botvinik & Cohen, 1998). In this paradigm, participants tend to report 
ownership over a dummy hand thus expanding their own bodily boundaries. The paradigm 
consists in placing a dummy hand in front of the participants whilst their real hand is hidden 
from view. Subsequently, both hands are stroked either synchronously (at the same time) or 
asynchronously (typically out of phase) and most evidence shows that the illusion is stronger 
in the synchronous condition (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The 
illusion is reflected in an objective measure termed proprioceptive drift, participants report 
that the real hand is positioned closer to the rubber hand, and a subjective measure on 
questionnaires when participants report their perceived experience of ownership, self-
location or agency over the fake hand.  
The main theoretical explanation states that body ownership is inferred when 
external sensory inputs match each other (e.g. synchronous stroking) and also when they 
match the internal representation of the body, such as the orientation of the hand (Costantini 
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& Haggard, 2007).  An alternative explanation is that the RHI is disrupted by asynchrony 
rather than elicited by synchrony (Rohde, Di Luca & Ernst, 2011).  Given that both accounts 
make the same prediction with regards to the standard RHI conditions (i.e. synchronous > 
asynchronous), additional conditions are needed to adjudicate between them.  For instance, 
merely observing a dummy hand with no stroking to either the dummy or own hand (i.e. no 
temporal or tactile cues, only visuo-spatial cues) could act as a baseline.  This vision-only 
condition also elicits the RHI, at least in terms of proprioceptive drift, albeit not as strong as 
the synchronous condition (Rohde et al., 2011; Samad, Chung & Shams, 2015).  This 
suggests that whilst the RHI is influenced by temporal signals (both enhanced by 
synchronous cues and disrupted by asynchronous ones) it is not critically dependent on 
them (also Durgin et al., 2008).  Samad et al. (2015) applied the Bayesian causal sensory 
inference model to explain these findings. This framework argues that the RHI derives from 
the perception of a common cause for sensory signals (proprioceptive, tactile and visual).  
This can also be construed as a judgment as to whether the sensory signals belong to the 
same body (one’s own) or not (hence, body ownership, is a particular kind of causal 
inference).  Incoming sensory evidence is contrasted with prior probabilities (e.g. the 
probability that the touch that I feel is caused by the touch that I see), in order to estimate the 
likelihood of a common cause.  Synchrony and asynchrony provide evidence for and against 
a common cause.  In the absence of temporal cues, the mere visual presence of an 
appropriate hand in peripersonal space constitutes supportive evidence of common cause.  
This occurs because, in this model, visual information is weighted more strongly than 
proprioceptive information owing to the fact that vision is expected to be precise (termed 
higher precision-weighting) even though vision is misleading in this context.  In Bayesian-
related predictive processing models, the discrepancy between the sensory evidence and 
the model (i.e. the belief in common cause or not) is termed a prediction error and the 
system seeks to minimise this.  Proprioception always provides evidence against a common 
cause (because the felt position of the limb contradicts the observed limb position) and 
would generate a prediction error.  To resolve the prediction error there are two options: 
either to reject the model of common cause (i.e. believe the proprioceptive signal) or to shift 
the sensory evidence to make it fit better with a common cause (i.e. generate a 
proprioceptive drift).   
 In this Bayesian inference framework, there are multiple ways in which individual 
differences (e.g. due to normal variation or clinical or neurological conditions) can manifest 
themselves.  For instance, some people may differ in the reliability of sensory evidence from 
one or more channels and, specifically, this framework predicts that people will ‘play to their 
strengths’ (i.e. weight precise evidence more strongly; Ernst & Banks, 2002).   For instance, 
someone with good proprioceptive abilities (who knows precisely where their limbs are in 
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space) should weight this information strongly and be less susceptible to the illusion (and 
vice versa for someone with poor proprioception).  Other people may have biases within 
their internal model, such as a greater tendency to perceive common causes given 
ambiguous evidence (a trait linked to Schizophrenia e.g. Tschacher & Kupper, 2006) or 
greater top-down expectancies of percept-like experiences (‘phenomenological control’; 
Lush et al., 2020).  In a recent study, Botan et al. (2018) reported an atypical pattern in the 
RHI in a group of people who report sensory-localised vicarious pain (i.e. they feel pain 
when seeing others in pain localised to the same body part).  This pattern consisted of 
experiencing the RHI both in the synchronous and in the asynchronous condition.  This 
pattern has very rarely been reported in the literature (but see Kaplan, Enticott, Hohwy, 
Castle, & Rossell, 2014; Zopf, Contini, Fowler, Mondraty, & Williams, 2016) and runs against 
one of the central dogmas in this field (i.e. synchronous > asynchronous).  One might 
wonder whether this reflects a general tendency to report the RHI under all conditions, but 
Botan et al. (2018) showed that this was not the case.  They reported two control conditions 
that did not elicit an RHI in any group: one in which the dummy is stroked but not the real 
hand, and the converse condition of stroking the real hand but not the dummy.  In the study 
below we seek to replicate and extend these observations.  Specifically, we note that in the 
most commonly used asynchronous condition of the RHI the visual and tactile signals are 
correlated and predictable: the strokes are alternated at a fixed temporal lag.  In other 
paradigms, correlated sensory signals with a fixed temporal lag are integrated together (at 
least at short lags) which is assumed to reflect an inference of common cause (Fujisaki, 
Shimojo, Kashino & Nishida, 2004; Keetels & Vroomen, 2008; Parise, Spence & Ernst, 
2012).   Hence, it is plausible that – in some people at least – this kind of correlated 
asynchronous signal can elicit the RHI.  To test this hypothesis, we introduce a second kind 
of asynchronous stroking (termed asynchronous-random) in which the alternate strokes vary 
in speed, length and duration so there is no fixed or predictable lag.  We also introduce a 
vision-only condition in which no stroking is applied to either hand, with the aim to replicate 
previous findings that this condition can elicit a RHI (Rohde et al., 2011; Samad et al., 2015) 
and to determine whether this effect is more pronounced in our vicarious pain group.  The 
latter would suggest a mechanism of visual capture, i.e. an unusually strong discounting of 
proprioceptive signals in favour of visual evidence.   Finally, we measure individual 
differences in the variability of proprioceptive signals at baseline to determine whether 
people with more variable proprioceptive signals (less precision) are more susceptible to the 
RHI and whether this can account for any group differences. 
A second paradigm that has been widely used to investigate the bodily self is the 
enfacement illusion (EI), a facial analogue of the RHI, which uses tactile stimulation of the 
face to manipulate the perceived similarity with another unfamiliar person (Tsakiris, 2008; 
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Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard & Aglioti, 2010). The participants face is stroked whilst they see 
somebody else stroked on their face either synchronously or asynchronously, and the 
dependent measure is a judgment of visual appearance (not proprioception).  Namely, 
participants are presented with morphed faces - morphed between their own face and the 
face of the stroked person – and they have to judge the transition point at which the morph 
begins to resemble the other person’s face more than their own (termed Point of Subjective 
Equality, PSE).  After synchronous stroking the PSE is shifted from self towards other.  In 
effect it is as if participants have updated their own internal model of self-appearance to fit 
the sensory evidence, i.e. a recalibration of visual appearance to fit a common cause 
inference that the person that they saw being stroked was themselves.  Subjectively, they 
also report feeling greater ownership and agency over the model’s face (Tajadura-Jimenez, 
Grehl & Tsakiris, 2011).  In our study below, the EI complements the RHI in two important 
aspects. Firstly, it explores malleability over a face, and not only a hand. Secondly, it serves 
to clarify the role of proprioception in the susceptibility to bodily-ownership paradigms. If 
vicarious pain responders have particular difficulties in knowing where their body is in space 
or tend to weight that kind of information in an idiosyncratic way, then we would expect all 
groups to behave similarly (i.e. have the same PSEs and the same effect of synchrony > 
asynchrony).  However, if there are individual differences in higher-order judgments of bodily 
self-other (or body-based causal inferences more generally) then we expect a similar pattern 
between both paradigms. 
Having outlined the over-arching rationale behind the research, it would be useful to 
provide more detailed background on the special population under investigation, namely 
vicarious pain responders.  This is conceptually related to mirror-touch synaesthesia (feeling 
touch on one’s own body when seeing other people touched), although vicarious pain, or 
‘mirror pain’, experiences tend to be far more common being found in around ~20% of the 
population (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010).  Others have used the 
overarching term mirror-sensory synaesthesia to describe both of these phenomena 
(Fitzgibbon et al., 2010).   These are associated with various functional (fMRI) and structural 
(VBM) brain differences that corroborate the fact that these individuals are different (Grice-
Jackson et al., 2017; Holle, Banissy, & Ward, 2013).  These include, but are not limited to, 
regions involved in somatosensation.  For instance, there is evidence of reduced grey matter 
in the right temporo-parietal junction (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017; Holle et al., 2013), a region 
that is implicated in selectively attending to self versus other (Bird & Viding, 2014) and that 
has been implicated in the RHI (Tsakiris, 2010).  Grice-Jackson et al. (2017) developed a 
measure termed the VPQ (Vicarious Pain Questionnaire) which presents participants with a 
series of videos (of injections and sporting accidents) and requires participants to report, 
quantify (intensity), and describe (using pain and location descriptors) any pain experiences 
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in their own body.  Using clustering techniques, three groups were identified.  The most 
common group reported few if any pain-like experiences (non-responders or controls), and 
two groups frequently reported pain experiences: sensory-localised responders (S/L) 
reported localised pain experiences using sensory descriptors, whereas affective-general 
responders (A/G) reported non-localised, or whole body, experiences using manly affective 
descriptors.  The S/L group is more closely linked to mirror-touch (Ward, Schnakenberg & 
Banissy, 2018) and only the S/L group was reported to have the atypical pattern (on 
asynchronous stroking) in the RHI (Botan et al., 2018).  Hence, our main hypotheses only 
relate to this S/L group relative to non-responder controls.  A smaller A/G group is tested for 
completeness and they are predicted to be normal on this measure (i.e. similar to non-
responders). (A meta-analytic sample, combining data from this study with Botan et al., 
2018, is included in the supplementary results for the synchronous and asynchronous 




A total of 59 participants (mean age = 22.28, SD = 4.53; 49 females) took part in the 
study. Participants were recruited from the student population at Sussex University, and all 
but four (2 S/L and 2 A/G) had never taken part in our previous research on the RHI (Botan 
et al., 2018). Ethical approval was obtained from the Science and Technology Research 
Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex and all participants offered their written 
informed consent at the beginning of the study. 
There were 27 participants classed as non- responders (i.e. controls) (mean age = 
23.26, SD = 5.64, 19 females), 20 participants classed as sensory-localised (S/L) 
responders (mean age = 21.52, SD = 3.62, 17 females) and 12 participants classed as 
affective-general (A/G) responders (mean age = 21.42, SD = 2.64, 11 females). Although the 
latter group is smaller it is to be noted that this group was not crucial to our hypotheses 
(which focussed on the S/L group).  The groups did not differ by age (F(2,57) = 1.144, p = 
0.326, η2  = 0.039) or gender (χ² = 2.351, p = 0.309).  In the RHI task, 8 participants (6 
controls and 2 S/L) lack measurements for proprioceptive variance and the asynchronous 
random condition which were introduced at a later time.  They were still included in the 
analysis of the other conditions.  Due to technical and logistical issues, 7 participants (4 
controls and 3 S/L) did not complete the EI task.  
 
Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ) 
Before completing the tasks, all participants undertook the VPQ. They watched 16 
videos (no audio) of people experiencing physical pain (e.g., falls, sports injuries, injections) 
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(Grice-Jackson et al., 2017). After each video, they had to report if 1) they experienced a 
bodily sensation of pain; 2) how intense was that pain (1-10 Likert scale); 3) if the pain was 
localised to the same place, to a different place or generalised to the entire body; and 4) 
asked to describe the pain selecting various pain adjectives. These answers were used to 
generate the three variables (i.e., pain intensity, localized-generalized responses, and 
sensory – affective responses) entered the two-step cluster analysis conducted on a larger 
dataset of participants (Aged 18–60 years, mean age = 20.11, SD= 6.94; 290 Males, 1004 
Females).  For further details see Botan et al., (2018). 
 
Rubber Hand Illusion  
 This study used an identical procedure to Botan et al. (2018) for synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions, but additionally considered two new conditions (visual-only and 
asynchronous-random). 
Materials 
In the RHI task, participant’s right arm was placed in a box (86 cm across ×60 cm 
wide ×20 cm high) with a dummy right hand placed 20 cm to the left of it (measured from the 
two index fingers) at the body midline.  The top surface of the box had a section cut out of it 
so that only the dummy hand was visible during the experimental manipulations.  The top 
surface was entirely covered for the proprioceptive judgements and illusion ratings.   
Procedure 
At the beginning of each condition, the participant was asked to estimate the location 
of her/his right index fingertip three times by reading the corresponding number along a one-
meter ruler, the offset of the ruler varied each time to prevent repetition of the same number.  
This generated twelve baseline location measurements (three for each of the four 
conditions). The standard deviation was calculated for each participant across the twelve 
measurements, giving a measure of proprioceptive imprecision.  That is, a higher score 
indicates greater instability in knowing the location of one’s own hand.   
Four conditions were performed in a counterbalanced order across participants each 
lasting for 2 minutes: synchronous (the timing of the brush strokes on the rubber hand and 
participant’s own hand was synchronized); asynchronous (the timing of the brush strokes 
was out of phase by approximately 625ms); vision-only (no stroking at all, the participants 
had to look at the rubber hand for 2 minutes) and asynchronous random (the timing of the 
brush strokes was out of phase, but this time was completely random; the participants could 
not predict when the next stroke would start or whether it would be fast or slow).  The 
stroking was always applied to the index finger using paintbrushes. 
Post-induction finger location judgements were obtained in the same manner as the 
initial baseline. Proprioceptive drift was calculated by subtracting the average of the pre-
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induction finger location judgements from the average of post-induction finger location 
judgement. 
After each condition, participants completed the RHI questionnaire comprising 10 
items divided into three subscales: ownership, location, and agency (Longo, Schüür, 
Kammers, Tsakiris & Haggard, 2008), see Supplementary Materials and Results S1.1 for 
further details. The items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 
7=strongly agree). 
 
Enfacement illusion (EI) 
This was closely based on previous published procedures (Tajadura-Jimez et al., 
2011; Maister, Banissy & Tsakiris, 2013).   
Materials 
The EI task comprised 120s-long clips showing the face of a model being stroked on 
the right cheek with a cotton bud at a frequency of approximately one stroke per second.  
There were four models: two females and two males.  Digital photographs of their faces 
were taken and subsequently edited in Photoshop CS6, removing all non-facial attributes 
(i.e. hair, ears etc.) using an oval mask and superimposing it on to a uniform grey 
background. Both clips and photographs were in black and white and the models had a 
neutral expression. The models and participants were gendered matched and both models 
were Caucasian (N.B. race does not seem to influence the illusion; Bufalari, Lenggenhager, 
Porciello, Serra, Holmes & Aglioti, 2014). 
Prior to the experiment, a photograph of the participant face was also taken and 
edited following the same procedure as the models’ photographs. Subsequently, the 
participant face was morphed into the model face using the Abrasoft FantaMorph5 software. 
The procedure generated morphs of 2% increments in which the participant’s face was 
merged with the model face resulting in 50 pictures per model (Sforza et al., 2010). The 
morphs used in the task varied between 30% and 70% resulting in a total of 21 morphed 
pictures, the first picture representing 30:70 model:participant and the last picture 70:30 
model:participant. 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two blocks - synchronous and asynchronous – the order 
of which was counterbalanced across participants. A different model was used in the 
asynchronous and synchronous blocks to minimise any spill-over of behavioural effects 
across blocks and assignment was counterbalanced across participants (but the model was 
always the same sex as the participant).   
A detailed representation of the task can be seen in figure 1.  At the start of each 
block, participants performed a baseline self-recognition task.  All 21 morphs were shown in 
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a randomized order and participants had to judge if the face looked “more like myself” or 
“more like the model’s face” (using left and right arrow keypresses respectively).  The movie 
depicting stroking to the model’s face was then shown whilst the participants own face was 
stroked, in the mirrored location, either synchronously (in phase) or asynchronously (out of 
phase by ~500 msec).  This was followed by another self-recognition task, with the movie-
task cycle repeated three times in total.      
At the end of each block, participants completed the EI questionnaire (Tajadura-
Jimenez et al., 2011).  This comprised 14 items divided into four subscales: ownership, 
appearance, disownership, and agency, see Supplementary Materials and Results S1.2 for 
further details. The items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 
7=strongly agree). 
Analysis   
For each self-recognition task, the point of subjective equality (PSE), representing 
the point when the participants cannot distinguish between self and other, was calculated 
using a logistic function (Bacaër, 2011). The logistic function was applied to the percentages 
of the morph data (x values) generating binary probabilities of y fitted values (Cramer, 2003). 
The x value corresponding to the minimum value of the sum of square differences between 
the y values (actual binary responses) and y fitted values (the binary probabilities generated 
by the logistic function) represented the PSE, namely the steep transition of the sigmoid 
curve.  For each condition, a PSE drift score was calculated by averaging the three 
experimental PSEs and then subtracting from the appropriate initial baseline.  For example, 
a value of +6 would mean that the experimental manipulation had shifted the PSE away from 
the self towards the other by 6% of the morphed images.  Whereas a negative PSE drift 
value would imply that the person resembles the other person less as a result of the 
experimental manipulation.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Data analysis 
All analyses were conducted in SPSS version 25 (SPSS Inc., USA). Synchronous 
and asynchronous conditions for objective measures of proprioceptive drift in the RHI and 
PSE in the EI were analysed using 3 (group) x 2 (condition) mixed model ANOVAs.  
The other dependent measures in the RHI task including proprioceptive imprecision, 
vision-only condition, and asynchronous random condition were analysed using between-
groups one-way ANOVAs. Most variables passed the Shapiro-Wilk normality tests and 
homogeneity of variance tests, the only exceptions being the vision and asynchronous 
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random drift in the S/L group (p<0.05). Pearson correlations between proprioceptive 
imprecision and drift magnitude in each condition were also run.  
Questionnaire results for both RHI and EI were analysed using non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests for ordinal data comparing all groups and subsequent post-hoc non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U tests comparing two independent groups.  
Outliers were excluded for each condition using SPSS based on the 3rd interquartile 
range (IQR) (Manikandan, 2011). Thus, one outlier was excluded from the asynchronous 
condition, four from the vision-only condition and one from the asynchronous random 
condition and 3 from proprioceptive imprecision. No outliers were found in the questionnaire 
data outside the 3-IQR. Subsequent post-hoc tests adjusted for multiple comparisons 




 The results section first addresses the results of the RHI first by considering: how 
proprioceptive drift differs by condition across the groups; whether this is related to individual 
differences in proprioceptive imprecision; and finally consider self-reported illusory 
experiences.  The results of the EI task report the PSE and questionnaire measures in that 
order. 
 
Rubber Hand Illusion:  Proprioceptive drift 
 
The results for the standard RHI synchronous and asynchronous conditions are 
shown in Figure 2.  A mixed model 3 (group) x 2 (condition) ANOVA run on the synchronous 
and asynchronous conditions showed a statistically significant group X condition interaction, 
F(2,54)=3.756, p=0.030, η2=0.122. There was a main effect of condition, F(1,54)=7.918, p = 
0.007, η2=0.128 but the main effect of group did not reach significance F(2,54) = 2.006, 
p=0.144, η2=0.069. Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed that proprioceptive drift was significantly 
greater in the synchronous than in the asynchronous conditions in the control group, 
t(26)=4.268, p < 0.001, but not in the in the S/L group, t(18)=0.453, p=0.656 nor in the A/G 
group, t(10)=0.888, p = 0.395. For the asynchronous condition, independent t-tests revealed 
a significant higher drift in the S/L group when compared to the control group, t(44) = -3.621, 
p=0.001 and the A/G group, t(29) = 2.474, p=0.019. This replicates the findings of Botan et 
al. (2018) for these groups and these conditions. 
 




The results for the two novel conditions are shown in Figure 3.  No significant group 
differences were found in the vision-only condition, F(2,56)=0.008, p=0.992, η2=0.015  or in 
the asynchronous-random condition, F(2,44)=1.239, p=0.300, η2=0.003.  To test whether the 
illusion is induced at all in these conditions, relative to an a priori baseline drift of zero, one-
sample t-tests were conducted.  The vision-only condition also resulted in the RHI for all 
groups (one-sample t’s of 3.342, 2.266, and 4.003 all p’s<.05 for controls, S/L and A/G), as 
reported by Rohde et al. (2011). By contrast, the asynchronous-random condition produced 
no RHI in any group (one-sample t’s of .962, -1.090, and .739 all p’s>.1 for controls, S/L and 
A/G).  Thus, the tendency for the S/L group to experience the RHI in the standard 
asynchronous condition does not appear due to increased visual capture, but instead 
appears to depend on the predictable temporal lag between vision and touch. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
 The results for the measure of proprioceptive imprecision (i.e. standard deviation of 
proprioceptive judgments at baseline) are shown in Figure 4.  There were no significant 
differences between groups F(2,49)=2.705, p=0.077, η2=0.086.  In terms of individual 
differences across the entire sample, proprioceptive imprecision at baseline was linked to 
greater proprioceptive drift at test in two conditions: the asynchronous-predictable, r= 0.301, 
p=0.036 and vision-only, r=0.444, p=0.002 conditions (the correlations for synchronous and 
asynchronous-random are .087 and .097 respectively).  That is, in the two most ambiguous 
conditions participants’ proprioceptive abilities have a stronger influence: people with less 
precise proprioception tend to discount proprioceptive information and generate a stronger 
RHI.   Breaking this down by group, shows that the effect is driven by the S/L group (for the 
asynchronous condition, r = 0.716, p=0.001, for the vision condition, r=0.731, p=0.001).  The 
full set of correlations by group is reported in the Supplementary results.  Thus, whilst the 
S/L group do not have higher proprioceptive imprecision, they are more susceptible to its 
influence.  The data presented below, from the Enfacement Illusion, where proprioception is 
irrelevant, suggest that differences in proprioception cannot account for the overall effect on 
the asynchronous condition. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
.    
 




 The questionnaire data for the four conditions, and different scales, are shown in 
Figure 5.  Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H tests for ordinal data were used to analyse 
differences between groups for each condition and on each of the subscales. There were no 
significant differences between groups on any of the conditions or subscales (see 
Supplementary Results for the full breakdown).  In particular, it is to be noted that there were 
no significant group differences on the asynchronous condition that mirror those reported 
above for proprioceptive drift.  Previous findings show that these two measures can 
sometimes be dissociated suggesting that different mechanisms contribute to drift versus 
illusory experience (e.g. Holle, McLatchie, Maurer, & Ward, 2011; Holmes, Snijders, & 
Spence, 2006).  Within our dataset, there is other evidence consistent with this.  Across all 
groups, there is significant proprioceptive drift in the vision-only condition but this is not 
reflected in the subjective ratings which resemble both asynchronous stroking conditions in 
this regard (a mean score < 4 on this 1-7 scale indicates net disagreement with these 
statements).     
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
 
Enfacement Illusion: Point of Subjective Equality (PSE) 
These results are summarised in Figure 6.  PSE drifts for the synchronous and 
asynchronous blocks were analysed in a mixed model 3 (group) x 2 (condition) ANOVA.  
The results showed a statistically significant interaction between group and condition, 
F(2,50)=3.418, p=0.041, η2=0.120. There was a main effect of condition, F(1,50)=12.363, p 
= 0.001, η2=0.198 and no significant main effect of group F(2,50) = 2.271, p=0.114, 
η2=0.083. Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed that PSE drift, relative to baseline, was 
significantly greater in the synchronous than in the asynchronous conditions in the control 
group, t(22)=3.850, p = 0.001, and in the A/G group, t(11)=3.561, p = 0.004, but not in the in 
the S/L group, t(17)=-0.022, p=0.983. Independent t-tests revealed a significant higher drift 
for the asynchronous condition in the S/L group when compared to the A/G group, t(28) = -
5.024, p=0.001 but not the control group t(39) = - 1.749, p= 0.088.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
 
Enfacement Illusion: Subjective ratings 
The results are summarised in Figure 7.  Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H tests for 
ordinal data were used to analyse differences between groups for each condition and on 
each of the subscales. There were no significant differences between groups on most of the 
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conditions or subscales except for the disownership subscale in the asynchronous condition. 
Further Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the S/L group reported greater disownership in 
the asynchronous condition that the control group Z= -2.634, p = 0.008. For instance, they 
were more likely to endorse statements such as “The experience of my own face was less 
vivid than normal”. 
 





 The aim of this study was to use vicarious pain responders as a model system to 
explore individual differences in the computation of body ownership, in two well-established 
illusions: the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) and the Enfacement Illusion (EI).  These tasks can 
be construed, within a Bayesian Sensory Inference framework (Samad et al. 2015), as an 
inference as to whether different sensory signals reflect a common cause (with visual and 
bodily signals reflecting a single event bound to their own body) or different causes (multiple 
events across self and other). Mirror-sensory synaesthesia, which includes mirror-touch and 
sensory-localised (S/L) vicarious pain, has been hypothesised to reflect a disruption of self-
other control resulting in self-attribution of other people’s experiences (Ward & Banissy, 
2015).  The present study sheds new light on the specific mechanisms that might underpin 
this.  Specifically, there was a greater tendency to infer body ownership (common cause) 
after asynchronous stimulation in the S/L group.  This depended crucially on the 
asynchronous signals being predictable (fixed temporal lag) and was eliminated on control 
conditions (vision-only, asynchronous-random) but it did not depend on the nature of the 
judgment (proprioceptive for RHI, visual appearance for EI).  This suggests that the S/L 
group have differences in their internal model (i.e. less stringent assumptions about what is 
causal) that impacts on their experience of body ownership. 
 In other paradigms, perceivers have been shown to ‘recalibrate’ lagging sensory 
signals to be consistent with an internal model of common cause (Fujisaki, et al. 2004; 
Keetels & Vroomen, 2008; Parise et al. 2012). As such, what is unusual about the S/L group 
is the fact that they do so at larger temporal lags rather than the fact that they do this at all.  
Other research suggests that the RHI can be elicited at delayed visual feedback up to 300 
msec but reduces thereafter (Shimada, Fukuda, & Hiraki, 2009), and that this change in 
proprioceptive drift with delay doesn’t follow the same pattern as perceptual judgments of 
delay (Shimada, Suzuki, Yoda, & Hayashi, 2014).  It is currently unknown whether this 
15 
 
difference is limited to causal inferences relating to body ownership (i.e. domain-specific 
effect) or whether they would extend to other kinds of judgments such as audio-visual 
synchrony for non-bodily events (a domain-general effect) (for related research see 
Costantini et al., 2016).  Some researchers have speculated that mirror-sensory 
synaesthesia may be a result of domain-general differences in task control (Heyes & 
Catmur, 2015).  It is also possible that the S/L group will be more likely to infer common 
cause over wider spatial as well as temporal windows.  The RHI dissipates as the real and 
dummy hands are positioned further apart in space (Preston, 2013), but it is conceivable that 
this is not the case in the S/L group (consistent with the idea that they can feel touch/pain 
seen on other bodies at a distance).   
The current study also compared a small group of participants who report vicarious 
pain that is non-localised and described more in terms of affective pain descriptors (termed 
A/G or affective-general responders).   The A/G group differed from the S/L in the 
asynchronous-predictable condition (both RHI and EI) and, overall, they tend to resemble 
the control group (Supplementary Material shows a combined analysis of data from this 
study and Botan et al. 2018).  A full consideration of this difference is beyond the scope of 
the present research, but one possibility is that S/L differ in processing of exteroceptive 
signals (whether limited to the body or not) whereas the A/G group reflects differences in the 
interoceptive domain.  On other measures, the A/G and S/L group appear similar such as 
reporting greater emotional contagion and more depersonalisation-like experiences (Botan, 
Bowling, Banissy, Critchley, & Ward, 2018; Bowling, Botan, Santiesteban, Ward, & Banissy, 
2019).  
 This study highlights the importance of not only studying the modal pattern of 
behaviour but also to consider variations in this.  Although we have studied an atypical 
group, they are not exceptionally rare (12.3% in a sample of over 1000; Botan et al. 2018), 
and they were recruited from within standard psychology undergraduate cohorts.  It is likely 
that all previous studies using the RHI and EI paradigms will have recruited and included 
some S/L responders unless, that is, they were excluded for producing unexpected results 
(i.e. no difference between synchrony and asynchrony).  Whereas previous studies would 
have regarded data from these participants as noise, here we show that these differences 
within the ‘normal’ population are coherent (i.e. resemble each other but differ from the 
norm) and meaningful (i.e. reflects some non-trivial difference in the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms).  
 The results of the present research also have important implications for our 
understanding of the mechanisms behind the RHI and EI.  First of all, it is not the case that 
these illusions are driven by synchrony.  In the case of the RHI, the mere presence of a 
dummy hand can drive proprioceptive drift.  If anything, it is the presence of strongly 
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contradictory signals (e.g. our asynchronous-random condition) that disrupts the illusion as 
suggested by Rohde et al. (2011).  Secondly, we show a dissociation between 
proprioceptive drift and subjective illusion (questionnaires) on two different measures.  Drift 
and subjective ratings may depend on different mechanisms in the brain (for a review see 
Serino et al., 2013).  The S/L group showed greater proprioceptive drift on the asynchronous 
condition that was not reflected in subjective ratings for that condition.  Moreover, all groups 
showed greater proprioceptive drift on the vision-only condition that was not reflected in 
reports of illusory experiences for that condition.  Interpretation of the first finding requires 
some caution because the previous study by Botan et al. (2018) did find higher subjective 
ratings for the S/L group, and this group showed some evidence of higher subjective ratings 
in the Enfacement illusion.   
Another novel contribution to this literature is the introduction of a measure of 
proprioceptive imprecision (variability in knowing the position of one’s limb prior to any 
experimental manipulations).  The initial hypothesis was that people with greater 
proprioceptive imprecision would be more susceptible to the RHI (because they would 
weight vision more strongly).  The evidence here was mixed.  There was a positive 
correlation between proprioceptive imprecision and drift amplitude in the two most 
ambiguous conditions (asynchronous-predictable and vision-only) and this was led by the 
S/L group.  Thus, this group are more sensitive to their own proprioceptive abilities in 
addition to other differences in their causal inferences (noting again that proprioception is 
irrelevant to the EI task where they also show a group difference). 
One of the main limitations of this research is the limited sample size owing to the 
challenge of recruiting rarer groups.  Some of our findings are robust enough to directly 
replicate (e.g. the lack of synchrony in the RHI reported here and in Botan et al., 2018) and 
conceptually replicate (e.g. between RHI and EI).  However, other findings would benefit 
from further replication (e.g. our more exploratory measure of proprioceptive imprecision) 
and, in the case of null results (e.g. visual capture), we do not claim evidence of absence (as 
opposed to absence of evidence).  Theoretically, we also lack a fully detailed model of how 
individual differences in body ownership map on to the behavioural phenotype of vicarious 
pain and how broad or narrow those differences are.  Does it extend to all kinds of causal 
inferences, and what other real-world or clinical measures relate to this subgroup? 
In summary, the present study further explored susceptibility of vicarious pain 
responders to bodily ownership illusions by employing both RHI and EI paradigms. S/L 
responders display atypical susceptibility to bodily ownership illusions by treating 
asynchronous but predictable visuo-tactile signals as reflecting a common cause (i.e. 
















Figure 2. Proprioceptive drift in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions in each 










Figure 3. Proprioceptive drift in the vision-only condition (left) and asynchronous-random 













Figure 4. left: Mean proprioceptive imprecision at baseline expressed in mm (bars show 1 
SEM); top right: correlation between proprioceptive imprecision at baseline and drift in 
vision-only condition; bottom right: correlation between proprioceptive imprecision at 







Figure 5.  Mean subjective ratings for the RHI questionnaire according to group and 






Figure 6. PSE drift relative to baseline for synchronous and asynchronous conditions in each 





Figure 7.  Mean subjective ratings for the EI questionnaire according to group and subscale.  







Bacaër, N. (2011). A Short History of Mathematical Population Dynamics. London: Springer-
Verlag London Ltd. 
Bird, G., & Viding, E. (2014). The self to other model of empathy: Providing a new framework 
for understanding empathy impairments in psychopathy, autism, and alexithymia. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Review, 47, 520–532. 
doi:doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.09.021 
Botan, V., Bowling, N. C., Banissy, M. J., Critchley, H., & Ward, J. (2018). Individual 
Differences in Vicarious Pain Perception Linked to Heightened Socially Elicited 
Emotional States. Frontiers in psychology, 9. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02355 
Botan, V., Fan, S., Critchley, H., & Ward, J. (2018). Atypical susceptibility to the rubber hand 
illusion linked to sensory-localised vicarious pain perception. Consciousness And 
Cognition, 60, 62-71. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.02.010 
Bowling, N. C., Botan, V., Santiesteban, I., Ward, J., & Banissy, M. J. (2019). Atypical bodily 
self-awareness in vicarious pain responders. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B-Biological Sciences, 374(1787). doi:10.1098/rstb.2018.0361 
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal 
selfhood. Trends In Cognitive Sciences, 13(1), 7-13. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes 
see. Nature, 391(6669), 756-756. doi: 10.1038/35784 
Bufalari, I., Lenggenhager, B., Porciello, G., Serra Holmes, B., & Aglioti, S. (2014). Enfacing 
others but only if they are nice to you. Frontiers In Behavioral Neuroscience, 8. doi: 
10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00102 
Costantini, M. (2014). Body perception, awareness, and illusions. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science 
Costantini, M., & Haggard, P. (2007). The rubber hand illusion: Sensitivity and reference 
frame for body ownership. Consciousness And Cognition, 16(2), 229-240. doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2007.01.001ience, 5(5), 551-560. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1309 
26 
 
Costantini, M., Robinson, J., Migliorati, D., Donno, B., Ferri, F., & Northoff, G. (2016). 
Temporal limits on rubber hand illusion reflect individuals' temporal resolution in 
multisensory perception. Cognition, 157, 39-48. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.010 
Cramer, J. (2003). The Origins of Logistic Regression. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi: 
10.2139/ssrn.360300 
Derbyshire, S., Osborn, J., & Brown, S. (2013). Feeling the pain of others is associated with 
self-other confusion and prior pain experience. Frontiers In Human Neuroscience, 7. 
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00470 
Durgin, F., Evans, L., Dunphy, N., Klostermann, S., & Simmons, K. (2007). Rubber Hands 
Feel the Touch of Light. Psychological Science, 18(2), 152-157. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01865.x 
Ernst, M., & Banks, M. (2002). Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a 
statistically optimal fashion. Nature, 415(6870), 429-433. doi: 10.1038/415429a 
Feinberg, T., Venneri, A., Simone, A., Fan, Y., & Northoff, G. (2009). The neuroanatomy of 
asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia. Journal Of Neurology, Neurosurgery & 
Psychiatry, 81(3), 276-281. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.2009.188946 
Fitzgibbon, B. M., Giummarra, M. J., Georgiou-Karistianis, N., Enticott, P. G., & Bradshaw, J. 
L. (2010). Shared pain: From empathy to synaesthesia. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 34(4), 500-512. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.10.007 
Fujisaki, W., Shimojo, S., Kashino, M., & Nishida, S. (2004). Recalibration of audiovisual 
simultaneity. Nature Neuroscience, 7(7), 773-778. doi: 10.1038/nn1268 
Grice-Jackson, T., Critchley, H., Banissy, M., & Ward, J. (2017). Common and distinct neural 
mechanisms associated with the conscious experience of vicarious pain. Cortex, 94, 
152-163. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2017.06.015 
Heyes, C., & Catmur, C. (2015). A task control theory of mirror-touch synesthesia. Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 6(2-3), 141-142. doi:10.1080/17588928.2015.1057485 
27 
 
Holle, H., McLatchie, N., Maurer, S., & Ward, J. (2011). Proprioceptive drift without illusions 
of ownership for rotated hands in the “rubber hand illusion” paradigm. Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 2(3-4), 171-178. doi: 10.1080/17588928.2011.603828 
Holle, H., Banissy, M. J., & Ward, J. (2013). Functional and structural brain correlates of 
mirror-touch synaesthesia. NeuroImage, 83, 1041-1050.  
Holmes, N. P., Snijders, H. J., & Spence, C. (2006). Reaching with alien limbs: Visual 
exposure to prosthetic hands in a mirror biases proprioception without accompanying 
illusions of ownership. Perception & Psychophysics, 68(4), 685-701. 
doi:10.3758/bf03208768 
Ide, M. (2013). The Effect of “Anatomical Plausibility” of Hand Angle on the Rubber-Hand 
Illusion. Perception, 42(1), 103-111. doi: 10.1068/p7322 
Kaplan, R. A., Enticott, P. G., Hohwy, J., Castle, D. J., & Rossell, S. L. (2014). Is Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder Associated with Abnormal Bodily Self-Awareness? A Study 
Using the Rubber Hand Illusion. PLoS One, 9(6). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099981 
Keetels, M., & Vroomen, J. (2008). Temporal recalibration to tactile-visual asynchronous 
stimuli. Neuroscience Letters, 430(2), 130-134.  
Longo, M., Schüür, F., Kammers, M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). What is 
embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition, 107(3), 978-998. doi: 
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.004 
Lush, P., Botan, V., Scott, R. B., Seth, A. K., Ward, J., & Dienes, Z. (2020). Trait 
phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber 
hand illusion. Nature Communications, 11, article 4853 
Maister, L., Banissy, M., & Tsakiris, M. (2013). Mirror-touch synaesthesia changes 
representations of self-identity. Neuropsychologia, 51(5), 802-808. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.020 
Manikandan, S. (2011). Measures of dispersion. Journal Of Pharmacology And 
Pharmacotherapeutics, 2(4), 315. doi: 10.4103/0976-500x.85931 
28 
 
Osborn, J., & Derbyshire, S. W. G. (2010). Pain sensation evoked by observing injury in 
others. Pain, 148, 268-274.  
Parise, C., Spence, C., & Ernst, M. (2012). When correlation implies causation in 
multisensory integration. Journal Of Vision, 12(9), 611-611. doi: 10.1167/12.9.611 
Preston, C. (2013). The role of distance from the body and distance from the real hand in 
ownership and disownership during the rubber hand illusion. Acta 
Psychologica, 142(2), 177-183. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.12.005 
Rohde, M., Di Luca, M., & Ernst, M. (2011). The Rubber Hand Illusion: Feeling of Ownership 
and Proprioceptive Drift Do Not Go Hand in Hand. Plos ONE, 6(6), e21659. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0021659 
Samad, M., Chung, A., & Shams, L. (2015). Perception of Body Ownership Is Driven by 
Bayesian Sensory Inference. PLOS ONE, 10(2), e0117178. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0117178 
Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jimenez, A., & Lopez, C. 
(2013). Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-
consciousness. Consciousness And Cognition, 22(4), 1239-1252. doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2013.08.013 
Sforza, A., Bufalari, I., Haggard, P., & Aglioti, S. (2010). My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial 
stimulation influences sense of identity. Social Neuroscience, 5(2), 148-162. doi: 
10.1080/17470910903205503 
Shimada, S., Fukuda, K., & Hiraki, K. (2009). Rubber Hand Illusion under Delayed Visual 
Feedback. PLoS One, 4(7), 5. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006185 
Shimada, S., Suzuki, T., Yoda, N., & Hayashi, T. (2014). Relationship between sensitivity to 
visuotactile temporal discrepancy and the rubber hand illusion. Neuroscience 
Research, 85, 33-38. doi:10.1016/j.neures.2014.04.009 
Tajadura-Jimenez, A., Grehl, S., & Tsakiris, M. (2011). The other in Me: Interpersonal 
Multisensory Stimulation Changes the Mental Representation of the Self. I-
Perception, 2(8), 963-963. doi: 10.1068/ic963 
29 
 
Tsakiris, M. (2008). Looking for Myself: Current Multisensory Input Alters Self-Face 
Recognition. Plos ONE, 3(12), e4040. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0004040 
Tsakiris, M. (2017). The multisensory basis of the self: From body to identity to 
others. Quarterly Journal Of Experimental Psychology, 70(4), 597-609. doi: 
10.1080/17470218.2016.1181768 
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005). The Rubber Hand Illusion Revisited: Visuotactile 
Integration and Self-Attribution. Journal Of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception And Performance, 31(1), 80-91. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.80 
Tsakiris, M. (2010). My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership. 
Neuropsychologia, 48(3), 703-712. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.034 
Tschacher, W., & Kupper, Z. (2006). Perception of causality in schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, S106-S112. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbl018 
Ward, J., & Banissy, M. (2015). Explaining mirror-touch synesthesia. Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 6(2-3), 118-133. doi: 10.1080/17588928.2015.1042444 
Ward, J., Schnakenberg, P., & Banissy, M. (2018). The relationship between mirror-touch 
synaesthesia and empathy: New evidence and a new screening tool. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 35(5-6), 314-332. doi: 10.1080/0264329 
Zopf, R., Contini, E., Fowler, C., Mondraty, N., & Williams, M. A. (2016). Body distortions in 
Anorexia Nervosa: Evidence for changed processing of multisensory bodily signals. 
Psychiatry Research, 245, 473-481. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2016.09.003 
 
 
